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Florence Ashley* Genderfucking Non-Disclosure: Sexual Fraud,
Transgender Bodies, and Messy Identities
If I don't tell you that I was assigned male at birth, as a transgender person, can
I go to jail for sexual assault by fraud? In some jurisdictions like England or Israel,
the answer is: yes. Previous arguments against this criminalisation have focused on
the realness of trans people's genders: since trans men are men and trans women
are women, it is not misleading for them to present as they do. Highlighting the
limitations of this position, which doesn't fully account for the messiness of gendered
experiences, the author puts forward an argument against the criminalisation of
(trans)gender history non-disclosure rooted in privacy. Gender identity is a private
matter and people should not be forced to figure it out or communicate it to others
to have an intimate life. Mobilised in this context, privacy can be understood as a
refusal of the state's authority to order our gendered lives. The author argues that this
mobilisation is compatible with leftist critiques of privacy. Finally, the author considers
whether (trans)gender history non-disclosure is a criminal offence in Canada and
concludes that it is not.
Si je ne dis pas que je fus assignee gargon a la naissance, en tant que personne
trans, pourrai-je etre envoyee en prison pour agression sexuelle par fraude? Dans
certaines juridictions comme I'Angleterre ou Israel, la reponse est : oui. Par le passe,
les arguments contre cette criminalisation ont place I'accent sur le caractere reel
du genre des personnes trans : puisque les hommes trans sont des hommes et les
femmes trans sont des femmes, als ne dupent personne en se presentant comme
tel. Soulignant les limites de cet argument, qui ne rend pas entierement compte du
caractere desordonne des experiences du genre, I'autaire met de I'avant un argument
base sur la vie privee contre la criminaisation de le non-divulgation de I'historique
(trans)genre. L'identite de genre est une question privee et les gens ne devraient pas
etre obligees de la comprendre ou de la communiquer aux autres pour avoir une vie
intime. Mobilise dans ce contexte, la notion du prive peut se comprendre comme
un refus de I'autorite etatique d'ordonner notre vie genree. L'autaire argue que cette
mobilisation du prive est compatible avec les critiques de la vie privee provenant de
la gauche. Finalement, I'autaire considere si la non-divulgation de I'historique (trans)
genre est une offense criminelle au Canada ou non, et conclut que ce n'est pas le
cas.
* Florence Ashley is a transfeminine jurist and bioethcist. Metaphorically a biorg witch with
flowers in her hair. They are currently an LLM Candidate at the McGill University Faculty of Law
and fellow of the Research Group on Health and Law.
340 The Dalhousie Law Journal
I. The law of (trans)gender fraud
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Conclusion
Introduction
My first encounter with (trans)gender fraud law came in the form of
an academic exploration. As a transfeminine jurist, I was seeking out
academic role-models and stumbled upon the work of trans jurist Alex
Sharpe. She has written various articles on the question of (trans)gender
fraud. (Trans)gender fraud refers to cases where consent to sexual acts
was considered to have been voided by the accused's failure to disclose
their gender or the fact that they were transgender. Most cases involve
trans men who did not disclose the fact that they were trans, although
some involved butch women and non-binary transmasculine individuals.
Because consent is held to be void, the accused are subsequently found
guilty of sexual assault.
I always disclose the fact that I am trans to my partners, yet the
knowledge that such a crime could exist sent a chill down my spine.
There's something dehumanising in being told that one's bare existence is
harmful to others. In one of the first cases of this kind-the 1991 English
case of Jimmy Saunders-the trial judge harshly condemned the failure
of the accused to disclose her (trans)gender history: "I suspect both those
girls would rather have been actually raped by some young man than
have happened to them what you did."1 People who shun social dictates
of cisheteronormativity are casually depicted as worse than rapists, an
affirmation that is egregious to the extreme.
1. Cited in Alex Sharpe, "Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender Defendants and the Legal
Construction of Non-Consent" (2014) 3 Criminal L Rev 207 at 222 [perma.cc/W8XE-45N9].
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Saunders did not express clear transgender subjectivity. Saunders
foregrounded lesbian womanhood as part of her legal defence2 and, when
asked whether she wanted to look "like a boy," she responded that she
merely wanted to look like herself At the time, however, genderqueer or
non-binary identities were just emerging in the English-speaking world,
leaving uncertainty as to whether she might have identified as genderqueer
or non-binary if she had access to those conceptual resources.' Her words
are certainly reminiscent of genderqueer subjectivity to contemporary ears
but are equally compatible with butch womanhood. Saunders deserves
protection whether or not she is transgender, whether or not she puts
forward a clear, intelligible gender identity.
More recent cases have tended to feature transmasculine individuals,
often in late adolescence or early adulthood. The accused in the 2013
English case R. v. McNally5 identified as a man at the time of the offence
but later appeared to identify as a woman, their gender assigned at birth.
In Israel, Hen Alkobi, who was charged in 2003 on similar grounds,
unambiguously identified as a man and produced clear transgender
narratives that were bolstered by in-court testimonies by transgender
activists.' Alkobi was twenty years old and had access to well-developed
trans narratives. Saunders was seventeen and lived at a time when
transmasculine identities were still emerging as separate from lesbian-
especially butch-identities. McNally was also seventeen, but spoke in
terms that indicated far less access to trans and queer narratives.
By speaking in terms of "(trans)gender," I seek to resist opposing
gender fraud on the grounds of the reality of trans gender identities.7
"(Trans)gender" suspends judgement and refuses to force people into
2. Aeyal Gross, "Gender Outlaws before the Law: The Courts of the Borderland" (2009) 32 Harv
JL & Gender 165 at 172; see also Anna Marie Smith, "The Regulation of Lesbian Sexuality Through
Erasure: The Case of Jennifer Saunders" in Karla Jay (ed.), Lesbian Erotics (New York: New York
University Press, 1995).
3. Gross, ibid at 214.
4. Seminal texts which laid the foundations for the emergence of genderqueer and non-binary
subjectivities were published after the Saunders decision: Leslie Feinberg, Transgender Liberation:
A Movement Whose Time Has Come (New York: World View Forum, 1992); Leslie Feinberg, Stone
Butch Blues (Ann Harbor: Firebrand Books, 1993); Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men,
Women, and the Rest of Us (New York: Routledge, 1994); Riki Anne Wilchins, Read My Lips: Sexual
Subversion and the End of Gender (New York: Firebrand Books, 1997). Since those texts emerged out
of the United States transgender scene, reception in England might have taken a few years longer.
5. R vMcNally, [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 [perma.cc/Z8A6-UBB6].
6. Gross, supra note 2 at 171; Israel vAlkobi, [2003] IsrDC 3341(3) (Haifa District Court, Israel).
7. Here, the "trans" is a modifier of"gender identities." I am speaking of identities which are coded
as trans, i.e. gender identities which differ from that corresponding to the person's gender assigned
at birth. I want to avoid the implication of identification with being transgender that is implicit in the
alternative expression "transgender identities."
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identifying themselves as transgender or as cisgender-but-gender-non-
conforming. (Trans)gender history is an unresolved superposition of
transgender history and gender history, speaking equally of transgender
lives and cisgender non-conforming lives. Whether trans people are
protected from criminalisation should not depend on whether trans men
and trans women are really men and women. Saunders and McNally
should be no less entitled to protection than Alkobi simply because they
cannot put forward a stable and uncomplicated self-understanding as trans
men. To hold otherwise would be particularly dangerous for the gender
non-conforming, transmasculine youth who have formed the bulk of
accusations.' Distance from urban centres, and therefore to large LGBT
communities and their narratives also featured in many of the charges.9
The category of being transgender "has the institutional power to order
certain experiences, even as it erases their complexity. 1 The operative
separation of sexual orientation and gender identity, however appealing
for many trans people, is a flawed and artificial one that is predicated on
the assumption of privileged access to certain narratives. While the two
are different, it can be difficult to distinguish whether one's experience is
one of sexual orientation or gender identity. To talk of (trans)gender is to
transcend neat social categorisation schemes, refuse to exclude others who
cannot provide us with palatable narratives, and delve into the underlying
material conditions faced by people who are accused of (trans)gender
fraud. Whether it is gender fraud or transgender fraud is immaterial.
Centering the ambiguity of identity and resistance to neat labelling
schemes, this paper argues that (trans)gender fraud should be opposed not
because transgender men are men, but rather because gender and gender
history are a private matter. Unlike the former, privacy does not require
people to express a clear identity as man or woman.
Privacy, understood as a refusal of cisnormative expectations of
gender disclosure, is more responsive to the material realities of (trans)
gender existence. By highlighting the importance for privacy as a ground
of protection for those whose gender identities may be less than clear-cut,
I call on us to enshrine a genderfuck politics into law. In trans and non-
binary communities, genderfuck typically refers to politically-motivated
practices of playing with or "fucking with" one's gender identities and
gender presentations in ways that overtly conflicts with mainstream norms
8. Alex Sharpe, "Expanding Liability for Sexual Fraud Through the Concept of 'Active Deception':
A Flawed Approach" (2016) 80:1 J CrimL 28 at 37-38 [perma.cc/4YT7B-SXHF].
9. Gross, supra note 2 at 225.
10. Gross, ibidat 216.
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of gender. In describing a politics as genderfuck, I seek to describe a
political approach that decentres narratives of gender identities as well-
defined, clear, and stable. A genderfuck politics "fucks with" gender by
rejecting the call to neatly locate ourselves within gender categories.11
Though people may locate themselves consistently within those categories,
they need not.
In the first part of the paper, I analyse previous legal cases from England
and Israel which bore on (trans)gender fraud. In the second part, I examine
the lived realities of transgender and gender non-conforming people and
explore the reasons why they may not wish to disclose their (trans)gender
histories. In the third part, I lay out the argument against criminalisation,
put forward by Alex Sharpe, which holds that trans men and women's
genders are just as real as cisgender people's and thus that trans men and
women are not deceptive. I highlight how this argument fails to protect a
wide range of trans and gender non-conforming people who are vulnerable
to criminal charges of (trans)gender fraud. In the fourth part, I propose
an alternative argument against (trans)gender fraud laws predicated on
the notion of privacy as refusal. Under this argument, privacy as refusal
succeeds in protecting this greater range of people targeted by (trans)
gender fraud law while avoiding the pitfalls of gender authenticity, which
reifies different but nevertheless rigid gender boundaries. In the last and
final part, I consider (trans)gender fraud within the context of Canadian
law, concluding that no such crime exists.
I. The law of (trans)gender fraud
The 2013 English case R. v. McNally involved someone who identified as
a trans man at the time of the offence and was accused of sexual assault
because fraud vitiated consent. McNally, under the name Scott Hill, had
developed a relationship with another teenager through a video game.
They eventually met and engaged in consensual sexual acts. The girl's
mother became suspicious of McNally and confronted McNally about
having been assigned female at birth. The police were contacted, and
McNally was charged with sexual assault. 12
At trial, the court emphasized the notion of active deception to find
McNally guilty of sexual assault. The court characterised McNally's
behaviour as deliberate deceit which laid beyond passive omission. As
Alex Sharpe astutely noted, however, the acts characterised as active
deception are little more than non-disclosure of gender history against
11. By choosing the term "genderfuck," I also seek to "fuck with" academic norms of propriety
which might deem such a term inappropriate.
12. McNally, supra note 5.
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a background where gender is assumed to be cisgender.13 The choice of
a male-coded name, reference to having children, talk of "putting it in"
and the purchase of condoms were all interpreted through a cisnormative
lens that saw the distinction between non-disclosure and active deception
vanish.14 Transmasculine people frequently choose male-coded names
either because they are men or feel more comfortable with the connoted
masculinity in those names. Trans people in heterosexual relationships
can have children by recourse to assisted reproduction. "It" can refer to
something other than a penis, and condoms are equally necessary when
sex toys are used. Thus, none of those actions communicate cisgender
manhood to those aware of trans and queer realities.
Relying on the general consent provision of the 2003 Sexual Offences
Act, the court convicted McNally of sexual assault. 5 The general consent
provision set out that a "person consents if he agrees by choice, and has
the freedom and capacity to make that choice." 6 The choice to rely on
the general provision is telling, because the court chose to extend fraud
vitiating consent beyond the traditional boundaries set in the same Act
two sections later. Under the later, more specific provision, consent is
absent due to fraud where there is an intentional deceit as to the nature or
purpose of the sexual act, or where a person known to the complainant was
impersonated. 7 The court made little of the fact that McNally seemingly
identified as a man at the time, and even went so far as to claim that
McNally "deceived not only others but also herself," 8 sending a bleak
message to all trans people. Not only is our gender not valid, but we may
be sent to jail for other people's prejudices.
The factual background of the 2003 charges laid on Hen Alkobi in
Israel was similar.19 Alkobi is a trans man who was accused of sexual
assault following consensual relationships with three cis women to
whom he hadn't disclosed his transitude.2 ° The court ruled on different
grounds than the English court in McNally, however. Instead of relying on
the general definition of consent to invalidate it, the court mobilised the
traditional notion of sexual fraud by impersonation-which the McNally
court mentioned but didn't apply-finding that Alkobi had impersonated
a fictional person named Kobi and, in doing so, committed sexual assault
13. Alex Sharpe, supra note 1 at 216-217.
14. Ibid at 217-218.
15. Alex Sharpe, supra note 8 at 30-31.
16. Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK), c 42, s 74.
17. Sexual OffencesAct 2003, ibid, s 76.
18. McNally, supra note 5 at para 47.
19. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 168ff.
20. The state of being trans.
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by fraud.21 In the alternative, the court mentioned that it would have found
fraud vitiating consent under a general definition of consent.22
I chose to focus on those two cases because they are the most recent
and readily available cases of criminalisation of (trans)gender history
non-disclosure. By choosing cases from multiple jurisdictions, I hope to
highlight how such criminalisation is not exceptional. Instead, it reflects the
pervasive transantagonism in a wide range of societies. In this paper I offer
a policy argument that is not tied to a specific jurisdiction's jurisprudential
approach to sexual fraud.23
In both cases, it was unclear whether the accused had disclosed their
gender assignment at birth. McNally claimed that the complainant knew
or suspected their gender assignment for years prior to sexual intercourse,
pointing out a disagreement and fallout that occurred two years before; the
court, however, dismissed this claim on the grounds that it is inconsistent
with the purchase of condoms.24 The chronology of events suggests that
the complainant might have known that McNally was transmasculine.
The complaint arose when her mother found out about McNally's
gender assigned at birth. Although the complainant described her sexual
orientation as heterosexual before the court, it is likely that her mother
was present-a reality that was also found in Saunders' prosecution. The
chronology is consistent with the suggestion that the complainant's mother
was the one who pressured the laying of charges, and that the complainant
only foregrounded non-disclosure out of fear of her mother. Furthermore,
dildos usually feel very different from penises in terms of rigidity and heat
transmission, making it all the more doubtful that she was unaware .26
Although it may seem implausible that someone would be willing to
send another person to prison to avoid being unfairly seen as a lesbian,
we must not underestimate the widespread and imposing nature of
heteronormativity and homophobia in our societies, a danger that, in
the case of family exclusion, is compounded by lack of access to LGBT
21. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 176-178.
22. Ibid
23. For a discussion oftransantagonism and its roots in cisheterosexual norms, see Florence Ashley,
infra note 31. (Trans)gender fraud cases have also appeared in other jurisdictions, including notably
the U.S.: State of Colorado v Clark (Sean O'Neill), No. 1994CR003290 (Colo Dist Ct, 16 Feb 1996);
State of Washington v Wheatley, No. 97-1-50056-6 (Wash Superior Ct, 13 May 1997).
24. McNally, supra note 5 at para 12.
25. According to Anna Marie Smith, supra note 2 at 174: "Saunders had had two women partners,
and one of them came from a middleclass family. The parents of the latter woman played an active part
in Saunders's prosecution. In Saunders's case, they were the real plaintiffs. The rape charge against
Saunders was intended to rescue the social value of her middle-class partner, to restore not only her
honor but that of her parents as well."
26. Author's personal experience.
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community resources outside of large urban centres. Indeed, one of the
original complainants in the Alkobi case wrote a letter to the trial judge
asserting that she knew Hen Alkobi to be a trans man but had been forced
to file a complaint out of fear of being exposed as a lesbian to her family.
As this complainant now identifies openly as a lesbian, this too recalls Hen
to womanhood.2" The heightened risk of false accusations due to familial
pressure and internalised homophobia, on top of the egregiousness of the
charges in the first place, only adds to the harms of criminalising non-
disclosure of (trans)gender history.
It is also noteworthy that the non-disclosure may not have been
causally efficacious. Both McNally and Alkobi were involved in romantic
relationships with the complainants. In McNally, there was talk of marriage
and children. Feelings of betrayal are often associated with disclosure of
gender identity, especially given this strong attachment, though it is unclear
whether this amounts to voiding consent and whether the feelings of being
morally wronged remain in the long-term, once potentially homophobic
and transphobic attitudes are processed.2" If McNally's factual assertions
are correct, the couple eventually resumed dating after the complainant
learned of McNally's gender history. The complainant also mentioned that
had McNally "told her from the start she wouldn't have judged [them] and
things might have been different."29 Is it true, then, that she only "consented
to the sexual acts because she believed she was engaging in them with a
boy called Scott"?30 Although the court assumed that the complainant was
deprived of the opportunity to grant informed consent and that she would
not have consented had she known, it is unclear whether those assumptions
are true. People regularly sleep with trans people, especially when they are
emotionally invested in the relationship, and the complainant herself said
that if McNally had told her, she might have accepted it. Specific facts cast
some doubt over whether the complainant knew McNally was trans, and
the court unfortunately failed to adequately develop its analysis beyond its
own prejudicial assumptions.
Lastly, the court in both McNally and Alkobi left open the question
of whether (trans)gender fraud charges could succeed if a trans person
has undergone genital reassignment surgery. This plays into mainstream
conceptions of gender as grounded in genitalia.31 Historically, courts
27. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 170.
28. Florence Ashley, infra note 31; Talia Mae Bettcher, "Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On
Transphobic Violence and the Politics of Illusion" (2007) 22:3 Hypatia 43 [perma.cc/V5Z8-CYX9].
29. McNally, supra note 5 at para 10.
30. McNally, ibid atpara 11.
31. For a discussion of the natural attitude about gender, see Florence Ashley, "Don't Be So Hateful:
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have relied on genital-centric criteria-especially the ability to engage
in cisheteronormative, pleasurable penis-in-vagina intercourse, as judged
from the perspective of the cis, usually male, partner-when called to
determine the gender of trans people.32 Since these criteria are rooted
in a desire to tame the very same homophobic anxieties found in (trans)
gender fraud law, it may be that trans people who have undergone genital
reassignment surgery would be exempt from the duty to disclose their
(trans)gender histories. At the same time, the United Kingdom threatens
marriages involving trans people with nullity should their (trans)gender
histories not have been disclosed, independently of genital aesthetics,
leaving us to wonder which of the two approaches would be adopted
should sexual fraud proceeding be brought against a trans person who had
undergone genital reassignment surgery.33
Alex Sharpe, criticising the United Kingdom law requiring disclosure
of (trans)gender history prior to marriage, puts her finger on the underlying
message of (trans)gender disclosure laws: "[T]his challenge to coherent
gender identity serves to bolster the problematic notion that there is
something of a yuck factor involved in sexual intercourse with transgender
people."34 This yuk factor is explicit in the previously mentioned citation
by Crabtree J. in the case against Jimmy Saunders: "I suspect both those
girls would rather have been actually raped by some young man than have
happened to them what you did."35
So egregious are the judge's words that we can wonder to what
extent the harm of (trans)gender fraud is projected by the judge onto
the complainants, rather than being responsive to their appraisal of the
situation. The complainant in McNally's case claimed that "if [McNally]
had told her from the start she wouldn't have judged [McNally] and
things might have been different."36 Yet, those same complainants also
The Insufficiency of Anti-Discrimination and Hate Crime Laws in Improving Trans Well-Being"
(2018) 68:1 UTLJ 1 at 12ff. Faced with trans people's existence, it may be appealing to reject the
invariability of gender in order to reaffirm the idea that gender is grounded in genitalia: this notably
allows people to accept some trans men and women as truly men and women, painting themselves as
friendly to trans causes, while at the same time refusing to recognise the majority of trans people's
genders.
32. Alex Sharpe, "From Functionality to Aesthetics: The Architecture of Transgender Jurisprudence,"
(2001) 8:1 MurdochUELJ, online: <www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/vgnl/sharpe8l.html> [perma.
cc/BK8K-PK8U].
33. Matrimonial CausesAct 1973 (UK), c 18, s 12.
34. Alex Sharpe, "Transgender Marriage and the Legal Obligation to Disclose Gender History"
(2012) 75:1 Mod L Rev 33 at 39 [perma.cc/6CJL-BPSB].
35. Alex Sharpe, supra note 1 at 222.
36. McNally, supra note 5 at para. 10.
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express themselves in terms of distress, disgust, or revulsion.37 In the
McNally case, the complainant referred to herself as "physically sick"
when she learned that McNally is trans.3" The harm is also hashed out
in relation to identity and self-conception: the complainant "considered
herself heterosexual,"39 a type of harm similarly highlighted in the
Saunders case. The quote heinously suggesting that complainants would
have preferred rape was preceded by the accusation that Saunders has
"called into question [the complainants'] whole sexual identity."4
The suggestion is that unintentionally having one's self-conception as
heterosexual challenged creates significant psychological and emotional
distress, warranting the intervention of criminal law. Would people feel so
distressed if not for their belief that there is something wrong about being
queer? As Anna Marie Smith writes, commenting on Saunders: "Certainly
no British judge would have interpreted a [cis] woman's imitation of a
[cis] gay man or a [cis] man's imitation of a [cis] lesbian as a crime that
was more serious than rape."41 Since a wide range of non-disclosure cases
generating psychological and emotional distress are not criminalised, we
must posit that there is something uniquely wrong in the court's eyes about
challenging heterosexual self-conception.
While the judge in McNally does suggest that only material factors
can sustain the charge of sexual assault by fraud,42 the question of
materiality involves a value judgement, and many lies or omissions will be
insufficient even though they may indeed have caused consent.43 Contrary
to English courts, the Israeli court in Alkobi relied on the notion of
impersonation,44 further restricting relevant harm to that of "nonvoluntary
and undesired homosexuality."45 Here again, we must ask whether the
courts projected their own support of compulsory heterosexuality onto
the complainants in finding that accidentally sleeping with someone in
37. Alex Sharpe, supra note 1 at 221.
38. McNally, supra note 5 at para 10.
39. Ibidatpara 11.
40. Cited in Kim Shayo Buchanan, "When is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent" (2015)
99 Minn L Rev 1231 at 1278 [perma.cc/53YA-33T9].
41. Anna Marie Smith, supra note 2 at 167.
42. McNally, supra note 5 at par 21: "Having rejected reliance on s. 76 of the Act, the court
observed (at par. 87) that the materiality of the use of a condom could be determined under s. 74."
43. McNally, supra note 5 at paras 23, 25. Despite having rejected analysis under s. 76, the judgment
seems to rely on the question of the nature of the act: "the sexual nature of the acts is, on any common
sense view, different where the complainant is deliberately deceived by a defendant into believing that
the latter is a male" (para 26).
44. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 178.
45. Kim Buchanan, supra note 40 at 1277; Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 182.
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breach of cisheteronormative conceptions of sexual congress amounts to
an egregious harm warranting criminalisation.
The harm of non-disclosure, it seems, only exists insofar as accidental
homosexuality, seen through a cisnormative lens, is a form of psychological
and emotional harm due to pervasive patterns of marginalisation in our
societies. If that's the case, we should follow Aeyal Gross in asking whether
"the injury that the complainants experienced [was] a product of their own
transphobia and homophobia, and, if so, does such an injury warrant legal
protection?"46 Continuing on the same train of thought, Gross adds: "Is
the injury rooted in what the complainants actually experienced, or does
the social conception of the type of relations that they experienced compel
them to understand the experience as injury?"47
II. The lived realities of trans and gender non-conforming people
The criminalisation of non-disclosure of (trans)gender history targets
vulnerable people. It criminalises sexual and romantic behaviours only
because they have been engaged in by trans people. This both exacerbates
and reflects the horrendous levels of stigma, discrimination, harassment,
and violence to which trans people are subject.48 The enforcement of
cisnormativity through (trans)gender fraud law deprives trans people of
whatever remaining power of gender self-definition they may have had
in intimate relationships. 49 Having to disclose (trans)gender history is a
source of emotional and psychological pain, reminding us that we don't
belong, recalling us to gender dysphoria and past trauma.
Disclosure of (trans)gender history is fraught with danger. Islan
Nettles,50 Gwen Araujo,51 and Brandon Teena52 are but a few of the
most well-known murders of trans people which occurred because their
46. Aeyal Gross, ibidat 199.
47. Ibid at 199.
48. Sandy E James, Jody L Herman, Susan Rankin, Mara Keisling, Lisa Mottet & Ma'ayan Anafi,
The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey (Washington, DC: National Center for Transgender
Equality, 2016) [perma.cc/2M4U-4YCJ].
49. This is reminiscent of Fanon's analysis of Blackness in Frantz Fanon, "L'experience vecue du
Noir" (1951) 179:5 Esprit, Nouvelle Serie 657 at 658 [perma.cc/E49K-GUWB]: "Le noir n'a pas de
resistance ontologique aux yeux du blanc." Groups which are othered in the dominant social imaginary
and organisation do not have ontological resistance in the eyes of the oppressor. The meaning accorded
to their bodies and existence is dictated by the dominant social imaginary and, because of hermeneutic
marginalisation, they are unable to provide a resistant social imaginary to the oppressor's eyes-only
within their own communities may they do so.
50. Nico Lang, "James Dixon Pleads Guilty in Death of Islan Nettles," Advocate (5 April 2016)
[perma.cc/7RZN-TWSF]
51. Marisa Lagos, "Mistrial Declared in Teens Killing," L.A. Times (23 June 2004) [perma.cc/C886-
XMZZ].
52. State v Lotter, (1998) 586 N.W.2d 591.
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transitude became known. Transfeminine people of colour are most at risk
of this kind of violence, but all trans people are subject to it. 3 Both popular
culture and daily experience expose the belief that trans folk are inherently
deceptive. For example, two cis men passing by me in the street while I
was in Quebec City for a conference blurted out, jokingly: "It's a trap!"
This casual association of transfeminine realities with deceit through an
accessible reference to Star Wars allows widespread dissemination of
anti-trans narratives which make disclosure hazardous. Whether or not
I identified as a woman was immaterial-I did at the time, but no longer
do-since I was identified as a "trap" on gender presentation alone.
Violence often flows from this ascription of deception. 4 In the
revelatory case of Islan Nettles' murder, the perpetrator James Dixon had
initially flirted with her. When he realised she was trans, he beat her to
death, later saying: "I just don't wanna be fooled. My pride is at stake."55
For many trans people, non-disclosure laws mandate an outrageous choice
between risk of prison and risk of death. Foreseeably, many choose to risk
prison.
In a large metropolis, access to trans and trans-friendly communities
may decrease the risks associated with non-disclosure. People in large
cities tend to be familiar with a greater diversity of people and trans people
tend to be more visible in urban areas. Furthermore, there is a larger trans
dating pool, enabling and fostering intra-community dating. Most trans
people I know date other trans people. My partner is trans; our relationship
is enhanced by our shared understanding of the gendered world and
never came with the risks typically associated with non-disclosure. Trans
communities also tend to share tips on how to manage and navigate the
difficulties of disclosure, and which signs to look out for which might
preface violence or rejection. It also circumscribes access to more
coherent and convincing trans narratives, and thus confidence as well as
convincingness. Nonetheless, not every trans person wants to be out-
transitude being an unwelcome and dysphoria-inducing fact for many
trans people-and a number of those who would like to be out choose not
to be due to danger. Those choices deserve respect.
The stories of Hen Alkobi and Jimmy Saunders happened outside of
large cities. 6 Nearly all of them-McNally included-were young people
at the time of the alleged offences. For trans people, age and geography
53. For a theoretical analysis of the grounds of this gendered dimension, see Florence Ashley, supra
note 31.
54. Florence Ashley, supra note 31
55. Lang, supra note 50.
56. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 225. McNally lived in Glasgow.
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are determinants of safety. Age, like geography, impacts access to trans
narratives, access to transition-related healthcare services, and access to
community support. Many transition-related services, such as bottom
surgery, are inaccessible for younger people, yet have a substantial impact
on the danger of disclosure due to the commonness of the association
between genitals and gender: trans people who have had genital
reassignment surgery are more readily accepted by prospective partners.
Older trans people are disproportionately excluded from community
spaces because they hold views and use a language that aren't in line
with the latest community norms. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier,
the general population in large urban areas tends to be better acquainted
with trans realities because of the concentration of trans people migrating
to metropolises, the greater population density, and the number of trans
community organisations.
Alkobi's case sharply contrasted with that of McNally. Contrary to
McNally-who was left to fend for themself and didn't articulate a clear
trans male identity before the court-Alkobi received testimonial support
from a number of trans activists in court. Backed by trans activists, it
may be much easier to set out mitigating factors for sentencing purposes,
as well as put forward the defence that trans men are men and thus not
deceitful-although judges have not dismissed any of the mentioned cases
on that ground. Perhaps it will be at the heart of a successful defence in
the future although, as I will explain later, people who are not trans men
or women should not be punished for their perceived deceitfulness either.
Threats of prosecution may arise in the context of abusive and
exploitative relationships. They can also arise out of a self-protective
interest. We have reasons to think that both McNally and Alkobi had
disclosed their (trans)gender history, contrary to what the judges found in
each case, and that the complaints were in part motivated by a desire to
appear heterosexual to family members. Although threats of prosecution
for sexual fraud in order to keep the trans person in an abusive relationship
are not well-recorded, they are common in the case of HIV non-disclosure,
another form of sexual fraud." In the Canadian case R. v. D.C., the alleged
non-disclosure was weaponised by D.C.'s abuser to punish her for leaving
his abusive ass." Because the presence of non-disclosure is a question
of fact for the court to decide with the aid of testimony-disclosures are
frequently verbal-even those who disclose may easily find themselves
threatened by their partner: "If you leave me, I will tell the police you
57. Kim Buchanan, supra note 40 at 1258, 1259.
58. RvDC,2012 SCC 48.
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didn't disclose that you had HIV and they'll arrest you." This risk is
far from theoretical and threats of this kind have been recorded several
times.59 Given the similarities in social context between HIV non-
disclosure and (trans)gender history non-disclosure, notably with regards
to the stigmatisation and marginalisation of those living with HIV and
transgender people, there are good reasons to think that the possibility of
prosecution for (trans)gender fraud also creates significant risks of abuse.
Taking into consideration the risk of assault and murder, the
psychological harm of disclosure, the risk of false accusations, and the
fact that (trans)gender history is a private matter, it is unsurprising that a
plurality of trans people opt not to disclose it.
III. Trans men are men, trans women are women
Alex Sharpe advances the argument that (trans)gender history need not
be disclosed because trans men are men and trans women are women. In
her article "Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender Defendants and
the Legal Construction of Non-Consent," she argues that non-disclosure
of (trans)gender history should be rejected as constituting sexual fraud
because trans gender identities are authentic-trans men are men, trans
women are women°60-and, in any case, considerations of equality and
privacy trump the desire to know (trans)gender history.6 According to
her, the prosecution and legal interpretation of such cases in the United
Kingdom was animated by discriminatory factors. 62 She reasons that
to treat (trans)gender history as a material fact "is to cast doubt on the
authenticity of the gender identities of transgender people." 63 Yet, she says,
59. Alison Symington, "Injustice Amplified by HIV Non-Disclosure Ruling" (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 485
at 485-486: "[T]here have been false threats against [people living with HIV] who did disclose and
also a great deal of uncertainty regarding when disclosure is legally required and how to prove that
disclosure took place."
60. One might argue, however, that authenticity is distinct from truth For instance, Talia
Bettcher points out that the claim "I am a woman" among trans women is best understood as an
existential commitment rather than a metaphysical claim and thus involves epistemic authority: Talia
Bettcher, "Trans Identities and First-Person Authority" in Laurie J Shrage, ed, You've Changed: Sex
Reassignment and Personal Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 98. In another article,
she argues that the debate over trans women's womanhood can be understood as a conflict between
dominant and resistant meanings associated with specific social subgroups: Talia Bettcher, "Trans
Women and the Meaning of 'Woman"' in Nicholas Power, Raja Halwani & Alan Soble, eds, The
Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 6th ed (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers)
233. How courts would take up theories which foreground the existence of different types of claims
(metaphysical versus existential), different types of definitions (descriptive versus ameliorative), and
different types of meanings (dominant versus resistant) is an open question. For the most part, courts
have bypassed these issues altogether by having recourse to anti-discrimination law-see, e.g., XY v
Ontario (Government and Consumer Services), 2012 HRTO 726, [2012] OHRTD No 715.




"their gender identities [typically] manifest early in life and, as already
noted, the phenomenon of transgenderism is recognised by the medical
community and the state provides both public funding for treatment and
provision for gender recognition."64
As Sharpe points out, answering the question of whether one is a
chromosomal man as the judge in McNally would have required cannot
be a neutral question.65 To answer 'no,' "involves self-diminution or
repudiation" as it posits a deficiency of manhood or womanhood on the
part of trans men and woman, which trans theorists and communities
deny.66 Suggesting people have a right to know is suggesting that trans
people's genders are less real or valid than cis people's, and thus that they
are exposing others to accidental homosexuality.6" This makes no sense if
trans men are just as much men as cis men.
Her claim with regards to equality is similar. Were non-disclosure of
(trans)gender history found to be a material fact, it should nonetheless
be judged as insufficient to establish sexual fraud insofar as it would
enshrine anti-trans beliefs into law.68 To hold people obligated to disclose
their (trans)gender history in order to access the world of sexual pleasures
creates a hierarchy with cisgender people on top and transgender people
at the bottom. Already hyper-aware of the widespread belief that their
genders aren't authentic, aren't real, trans people are further marginalised
by forcing them to engage in routine acts of self-invalidation in order to
have the same life as cisgender people.
Sharpe draws an analogy to non-disclosure of race: the idea of
convicting White-passing Black people of sexual fraud for not disclosing
that they are Black is abhorrent. Even if race was considered material, we
would object to non-disclosure of race being found to constitute sexual
fraud. By analogy, Sharpe argues, we should also reject sexual fraud on
the basis of (trans)gender history non-disclosure. Although the history
of regulation of trans bodies and racialised bodies differs in many ways,
notably given the history of slavery and anti-miscegenation laws, the
analogy holds some weight insofar as the criminalisation of non-disclosure
in both cases involves discriminatory and dehumanising attitudes towards
race and or transitude. The argument is strengthened by the findings of
64. Ibid at 219.
65. Alex Sharpe, supra note 8 at 44.
66. For a discussion, in French, of how notions of chromosomal or biological sex subordinate
trans people to cis people, see Florence Ashley, "XY" in Suzanne Zaccour & Michael Lessard, eds,
Dictionnaire critique du sexisme linguistique (Montreal: Somme Toute, 2017).
67. Alex Sharpe, supra note 34 at 40.
68. Alex Sharpe, supra note 1 at 221-222.
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the court in McNally which seemed predicated on the belief that McNally
was female. Considering the statements made by McNally before the court
about their own gender, Sharpe resolves the apparent inconsistency by
pointing out that at the time of prosecution McNally identified as male and
intended to undergo genital reassignment surgery, and that the subsequent
repudiation of this male identity was likely caused by the psychological
pressure of prosecution.69
With regards to privacy, Sharpe correctly notes that an obligation to
"disclose gender history to sexual partners requires the disclosure of highly
personal and private information.""0 Since disclosure creates physical risks
as well psychological difficulties, it outweighs the harm to the complainant,
which is understood in terms of disgust, revulsion, and challenge to one's
self-conception as a heterosexual person." Unfortunately, she does not
extensively develop her analysis in terms of privacy rights.
Although Sharpe's paper concludes by discussing Jimmy Saunders, she
does not centre Saunders' case and how it may challenge and undermine
some of her arguments. As noted earlier, Saunders foregrounded lesbian
womanhood in court but had adopted a masculine name and masculine
gender expression. It is doubtful that Saunders was a trans man, though
in more contemporary terms may have understood herself as genderqueer
or non-binary. Or, as claimed at the time, she might simply identify as a
woman. With either option, contrary to Alex Sharpe's claim that "gender
identity is already in the open" in the case oftransgender people, Saunders'
gender identity was not out in the open. 2
With the exception of her underdeveloped discussion of privacy, it
is not altogether clear if Sharpe's arguments would have saved Jimmy
Saunders from prosecution, given that she never overtly claimed a male or
non-binary identity. Her focus on McNally's being actually a man at the
time of the alleged offence confirms the suspicion that protection is owed
in large part because trans people are the gender they claim-something
which, although true, would leave a number of people vulnerable to
prosecution. 3 What of people who, like me, have a gender that is neither
69. Alex Sharpe, supra note 8 at 40-41.
70. Alex Sharpe, supra note 1 at 220.
71. Ibid at 221.
72. Ibid at 222.
73. In an article where she places herself in the role of a dissenting judge in the McNally case, she
ends her proposed judgment with: "Ultimately, law, and especially criminal law, ought to respect the
self-determination that is implicit in gender identity claims unless it can be clearly established that
they are fabricated." This seems to somewhat undermine her earlier assertion that a conviction would,
in any case "implicate law in unnecessary and unwarranted state intrusion and regulation of gender
and sexuality." (Alex Sharpe, "Queering Judgment: The Case of Gender Identity Fraud" (2017) 81:5 J
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man nor woman? 4 To cite C. Jacob Hale, we must be careful not to produce
,a representation of someone more solidly grounded in gendered social
ontology than the subject (recon)figured by that name actually might have
been."75
To be sure, given the prevailing social discourses around (trans)gender
fraud and transgender people more generally in the United Kingdom,
foregrounding the authenticity of trans gender identities is politically
warranted. Nevertheless, it is important to move beyond the claim of
gender authenticity and foreground a politico-legal discourse that can
protect all those who need protection including Saunders and non-binary
folks. To do so, it is necessary to centre the lives of those who inhabit a
contentious, uncertain space in the gender imaginary.
IV. Genderfuck privacy
1. Centering privacy
Federal and provincial governments in Canada have shown perfunctory
support for trans people in recent years. Toby's Act76 in Ontario-my
demiboy77 kitten's 8 namesake-added gender identity and expression
to the Ontario Human Rights Code equality provisions, making explicit
protections that have been extended to trans people by the courts as early as
1998. 9 All provinces have since followed suit. Federally, gender identity
and expression were added to human rights law by Bill C-16 in 2017.0
Support in Canada has been growing in recent years, and as people
grow more aware of trans identities and begin seeing them more and
more as part of normal human variety, I suspect that readers will share the
intuition that there is something horrendous in punishing (trans)gender
non-disclosure. "It's not anyone's business" is slowly becoming the
Canadian credo regarding transitude, a clear appeal to the right to be left
alone, which falls under the right to privacy.
Crim L 417 [pena.cc/4TVC-D6E6].
74. Genders that are neither exclusively man nor exclusively woman are known as non-binary
genders and people who have non-binary genders are known as non-binary people or enbies.
75. Jacob Hale, "Consuming the Living, Dis(re)membering the Dead in the Butch/FTM Borderlands"
(1998) 4:2 GLQ 311 at 314 [perma.cc/QJ68-8GDF].
76. Toby s Act (Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment Because of Gender Identity or
Gender Expression), SO 2012, c 7.
77. Demiboy is a specific non-binary identity that is used by individuals identifying partially, but not
entirely, as a boy or man.
78. Yes, my actual cat. I mean, if cats can be cisgender, why couldn't they be transgender?!
79. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse c Maison des jeunes A...,
[1998] RJQ 2549, 33 CHRR 263 (Quebec), subsequently applied inSheridan v Sanctuarylnvestments
Ltd. (c.o.b. B.J. sLounge), [1999] BCHRTD No 43 (British Columbia).
80. An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code, SC 2017, c 13.
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Understanding (trans)gender non-disclosure as privacy reflects the
thickness of privacy rights. They're not just abstract protections desirable
for their own sake. Privacy rights are a vehicle of trans people's safety,
emotional wellbeing, and substantive equality. This contrasts with a thin
view of privacy which would reduce privacy rights to a mere entitlement
to control some information for the sake of control.
The thickness of privacy is evident in its expression in Canadian
constitutional law. The right to privacy is not mentioned explicitly in the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, 1but rather has been interpreted
by courts as being part of section 7 rights to life, liberty, and security of
the person.82 In rooting privacy rights with regards to liberty and security
of the person, highlighting its relationship to psychological wellbeing, and
in linking it with human dignity,83 the Supreme Court acknowledges the
thickness of privacy in our constitutional landscape.
(Trans)gender history is one of the most personal types of information.
Disclosure of (trans)gender history exposes the individual to rejection,
impeding the development of romance and friendship,84 and exposes
them to psychological distress and physical violence. It also forces them
to foreclose their gender identity in ways they may not be ready for or
willing to.
Non-disclosure also has positive aspects. "[R]elationships between
self and others are based on an individual's ability to share and control
personal information,"85  prompts Alex Sharpe. The delayed and
progressive disclosure of personal information symbolises developing
trust and is integral to its development.86 By sharing information freely,
guided by our own emotional pace, we express growing intimacy and
trust, fostering the development of the relationship. Protecting privacy by
refusing to criminalise non-disclosure not only protects people from the
breaking down of relationships, but positively empowers the flourishing
of new relationships.
81. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
82. AMv Ryan, [1997] 1 SCR 157 (L'Heureux-Dube J, dissenting inpart) atpara 80.
83. Ibid.
84. Alex Sharpe, supra note 34 at 51. In Anna Marie Smith's interpretation of the Saunders case,
"[Saunder's] masquerade was indeed the condition of possibility of her relationships-not because of
the impossibility of lesbian sexuality in and of itself, but because of the fact that with the tremendous
pressures of homophobic bigotry which Saunders faced, she had had to conceal her lesbianism, and the
lesbianism of her partners, behind her gender masquerade" (Anna Marie Smith, supra note 2 at 174).
85. Ibid.
86. Kim Buchanan, supra note 40 at 1335-1336.
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The privacy argument against criminalising non-disclosure does
not turn on individual motive. Rather, it is that the non-disclosure as a
practice gives rise to privacy concerns, unlike poking holes in condoms
or stealthing.8 7 Because no significant privacy interest arises with regards
to the latter two practices, we are provided with a principled reason to
distinguish between the two from a criminal law perspective.
We can express the difference as that between deception and secrecy.
Moral philosopher Sissela Bok reminds us that "while all deception
requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive.""8 Sometimes secrecy
is a matter of restricting the flow of personal information and thereby
safeguarding ourselves against harm. In cases of protective secrecy, it will
be "hard to conclude [... ] that a decision to control personal information,
and in the process retain some sense of personal autonomy, is in any
significant sense unethical." 9
By introducing privacy, non-disclosure is faithfully portrayed as a self-
protective measure that, while acknowledging the psychological distress
of complainants, is justified by overarching concern for the wellbeing of
trans and gender non-conforming people, a heavily stigmatised group. It
further recognises that they deserve love, friendship, family, romance, and
sex just as much as the general population, undermining the notion that
those who don't fulfill the promise of cisheteronormative dating and, later,
marriage are less worthy of sex and love.
2. Privacy as refusal
During the trial process, McNally began expressing a cisgender female
identity. A number of factors make it unclear whether this identification
was a genuine expression of shifting gender identity. Gender identity is
not fixed and although very few trans people detransition, it does happen.
Further, people's gender identity can evolve in other ways, such as a trans
man growing to identify as a non-binary transmasculine person. However,
it may be also be true that McNally has "sublimated identity and desire in
the face of a legal and cultural world in which transgender and deception
87. Stealthing refers to the practice of non-consensual condom removal during intercourse.
Alexandra Brodsky suggests the creation of a new tort of stealthing in order to provide a remedy
against this practice, all the while recognising and resisting the further criminalisation of HIV non-
disclosure and other forms of non-disclosure: Alexandra Brodsky, "'Rape-Adjacent': Imagining Legal
Responses to Nonconsensual Condom Removal" (2017) 32:2 Colum J Gender & L 183 [perma.cc/
J97S-9SQF].
88. Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (Vintage Books: London,
1998) at 7.
89. Alex Sharpe, supra note 34 at 52, in the context of non-disclosure of (trans)gender history prior
to marriage.
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are viewed as synonymous,"9 as Sharpe believes. Foreshadowing their
guilty plea, their father mentioned that McNally said that they "may as
well plead guilty."91 This defeatist outlook was replicated at the time they
signed their statement, saying that they 'lust wanted it to be over."92 But it
could also be that McNally indeed came to identify as a woman.
McNally was young and did not seem to have a well-developed
knowledge of trans issues. Nothing in the case suggests an acquaintance
with trans community narratives, which have been developed over
decades to understand trans subjectivities. Young and unable to provide a
convincing explanation of how they could be a man despite their gender
assignment at birth, it would have been hard to resist simply accepting
their fate and taking up the cisnormative narrative put forward by the
judge. Indeed, it can be hard to resist even for people with access to trans
community knowledge such as Hen Alkobi, who mentioned in interviews
that he referred to himself "in the feminine form, but that this is out of
respect for his parents."93 McNally's age is also the age teenagers start
having more freedom and independence, which for many trans people
means beginning to explore their gendered feelings. Trans identities at this
point may not be solidly entrenched or confidently embraced, creating the
risk of a retreat to cis narratives in the face of conflict. However Jimmy
Saunders' identity may have developed, "[g]iven her comments on her
prison experience, it is highly probable that her nine-month incarceration
in Styal Prison-a detention which was meant to block further lesbian
imitations-actually reconstructed her lesbian identity after the trauma
of the first trial."94 Internalised transphobia is a common theme in most
trans people's experiential histories.95 If this explanation of McNally's
behaviour is correct, then (trans)gender fraud law is to blame for their
detransitioning and the risk of depression and self-harm that comes along
with it-a risk that is all the more palpable given McNally's history of
self-harm.9
Alex Sharpe's solution to (trans)gender fraud law, in the form of
arguing that trans men are indeed men, falls short of responding to the
concerns raised in the McNally and Saunders cases. Jimmy Saunders
identified as a lesbian and spoke in ways that suggested a fluid relationship
90. Alex Sharpe, supra note 8 at 40.
91. McNally, supra note 5 at para 31.
92. McNally, ibid at para 40.
93. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 168, fn 1.
94. Anna Marie Smith, supra note 2 at 177-178.
95. Alex Sharpe, supra note 1 at 209.
96. McNally, supra note 5 at para. 47.
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to gender identities. She resisted norms of femininity and wore masculine-
coded clothes not in order to appear as a man, but to be herself Speaking
of Saunders, Sharpe recognises that "gender queer is precisely the identity
position that [Saunders] occupies and lives. She should not be punished
because a sexual partner mistakenly assumes her to be male."9 While
Sharpe's argument does point to cisnormative assumptions underlying
judges' qualification of certain behaviours and presentations as deceptive,
it is unclear how it would defeat a claim of (trans)gender fraud, unlike her
central argument that trans men are men. Jimmy Saunders was not a man,
as far as we know. How, then, do we avoid her punishment?
The centering oftrans men's manhood and trans women's womanhood
in Sharpe's work is what Aeyal Gross calls, as noted in the introduction,
the "institutional power to order certain experiences, even as it erases their
complexity"98 that the category of transgender holds. While this narrative
of transitude is growing in mainstream knowledge and acceptance, it is
being increasingly resisted by trans people and fails to acknowledge the
complex history of transgender identifications through time.
The pressure to provide a coherent gender narrative as evidence of
the "reality" of one's gender is steeped in cisnormativity. It is the reaction
of a system that stringently orders people in well-delineated categories
of male and female. Butch lesbians are expected to be distinguishable
from trans men and from transmasculine non-binary people. Yet the
reality of gendered subjectivity, expressed in queer narratives, is one that
blurs gender categories. While many people will be able to clearly set out
whether they are a cross-dressing gay man or a trans woman, many won't
be able to. The queering99 of trans, which elicits the anxiety of a number
of trans theorists such as Jay Prosser, refuses necessity of clarifying
trans identities. Aeyal Gross attributes to Jay Prosser the belief that
"[q]ueer theory erases [...] the genuine experiences of the transsexual and
transgender subjects."1 ' Responding to this claim, Aeyal Gross recalls
Judith Halberstam's queering of trans:
97. Alex Sharpe, supra note 8 at 42.
98. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 216.
99. The verb "to queer" is used in a wide range of ways in academia that may or may not be
consistent. I use it here to refer to practices of destabilising binary, well-delineated conceptions of
trans identities, making room for messy, unclear identifications that resist the cis/trans binary. To
queer trans does not privilege non-binary identities, which are oftentimes clear and well-delineated or
look unfavourably on individuals who do have clear, well-defined understandings of their own gender.
Rather, it seeks to question the belief that we must have such a clear, well-defined understanding of our
own gender.
100. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 222.
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The queer mapping that Prosser rejected recognizes hybrid categories
and gives legitimacy and visibility to the hybridity of those who never
have a home, who cannot cross gender boundaries, who prefer to be
"gender-queer," and who live with the instability of their identities.
Indeed, under the new transgender model, or the "gender-queer" model
that extends it, we see people who are challenging the boundaries of
gender not by crossing to the other side but by living in the borderland,
refusing to identify as belonging to one of the genders or identifying as
belonging to both or, sometimes, even rejecting completely the idea of
gender.10
Yet, the experiential differences between the trans subjects contemplated
by Prosser and Halberstam can be illusory. Early in my coming out,
I identified as transfeminine because I did not feel fully at home in
womanhood. In order to present a coherent narrative that would ease
my access to gender-segregated spaces and to transition-related health
services, I sublimated the complexity of my gendered subjectivity and
began identifying publicly as a trans woman. Only recently did I begin to
identify publicly as transfeminine and non-binary again, empowered with
social capital as a prominent activist and secure in my access to women-
only spaces because of my ability to pass as a cis woman. Even though I
am largely indistinguishable in most people's eyes from a trans woman,
I do not wish to find a home in gender terms and if the law would so
let me, I would gladly opt for a gender marker reading " \(-) /-12I
often opt to describe my gender metaphorically, calling myself a "cyborg
witch with flowers in her hair." Of course, in the face of criminalisation, I
would expeditiously reframe myself as a trans woman, if only to avoid jail.
Though this is possible in my case, it is not for everyone: reliance on the
authenticity of trans manhood and womanhood is an inadequate response
to (trans)gender fraud laws because it leaves out those who are non-binary
or have a messy, difficult-to-characterise relationship to gender, forcing
them to either misrepresent their gender identity before the court or face
the risk of penal sanctions. We must account for all ways of being, whether
we wish to "carve out a borderland domain" for ourselves or establish "a
habitus located more firmly within social categories."10 3
101. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 223.
102. I have recently lodged a complaint with the Quebec Human Rights Commission which, although
it does not request emoticon gender markers, does request making all letters available as a gender
marker so non-binary people may represent their unique gender identities rather than the umbrella
category of non-binary. Maybe one day we can have scratch and sniff gender markers and then I can
have lavender smell as my gender.
103. Jacob Hale, supra note 75 at 340.
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Refusal, as an alternative to recognition, has been theorized by
Indigenous thinkers and activists. In her seminal work on the strategy of
refusal employed by Kanien'kehi:ka communities, Mohawk Interruptus,
Audra Simpson identified refusal as an alternative to the politics of
recognition.0 4 The settler colonial state does not know how to govern
alterity and seeks to impose rigid categories upon which are predicated its
response of apology and recognition, in the face of the cultural genocide
of Indigenous people in Canada. 5 Yet, as Simpson reveals, recognition is
only granted if the demand for inclusion does not challenge settler colonial
norms too much. 6 Indigenous refusal is a refusal to acknowledge the
primacy of settler sovereignty and the authority of the settler state to order
Indigenous experiences. 107
Recognising the emancipatory power of refusal is rife with solidarity
potential, insofar as it acknowledges the legitimacy of Indigenous refusal
and encourages us to show up for Indigenous people living on Turtle
Island. As we seek to refuse gender norms, we must recognise the urgency
of anti-colonial movements.
In the realm of gender, refusal operates as a rejection of the norms
of respectability which oppose protected trans men and women to
undeserving queers. °8 By calling on privacy, we can refuse to "choose
between being transgender and being "butch" lesbians."' ' We also refuse
the contemporary surveillance into our private sexual lives. We can refuse
to live in a comfortable, defined gender identity, and relish in the tense
comfort of the borderlands. 10 We must make the borderlands safe.
104. Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2014) at 11.
105. Ibid at 16, 19-20.
106. Ibid at 20.
107. Ibid at 11.
108. The notion of politics of respectability was first articulated by African-American History
professor Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham in Righteous Discontent: The Women Movement in the
Black Baptist Church, 1880-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). The term was
also adopted within queer and trans critical discourse: Mariana Valverde, "A New Entity in the History
of Sexuality: The Respectable Same-Sex Couple" (2006) 32:1 Feminist Studies 155; Susan Stryker,
"Transgender History, Homonormativity, and Disciplinarity" (2008) 100 Radical History Rev 145. It
also stands in close relationship to the notion of homonationalism, coined by Jasbir K. Puar in Terrorist
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). The
work of Dean Spade is also enlightening on this matter: Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative
Violence, Critical Trans Politics, & The Limits of Law, revised ed (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2015).
109. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2 at 228-229.
110. The understanding of identity borderlands was developed and popularised by the Chicana
feminist Gloria Evangelina Anzaldfua in her book Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San
Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987), and has since had an indisputably massive influence on queer and
trans feminist thought.
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We can make the borderlands safe(r) by opposing the state-imposed
mandate of having clear and well-defined gender identities; by refusing the
state's authority and legitimacy in policing gender categories; by refusing
the idea that gender is and ought to be well-defined. Through the right of
privacy, refusal operates the political-juridical claim that the state has no
business regulating how we navigate our own gender in the context of
consensual sexual relationships.
Unlike Audra Simpson's conceptualisation of Kanien'kehdi:ka refusal
which operates solely from outside of the settler state and in opposition
to it, refusal in the context of disclosure of (trans)gender history operates
through the language and power of the settler state, namely by articulating a
claim for privacy rights before the courts. Though this choice is pragmatic,
motivated by the need to avoid criminalisation, it does not and cannot
claim to be a decolonizing force, as it could be mobilised in furtherance of
colonial projects. Aeyal Gross' work highlights the relationship between
the policing of gender boundaries and national boundaries in the context
of the Israeli colonisation of Palestine helps us understand how refusal to
recite one's (trans)gender history can challenge the "sexual-gender-national
order" on which neo-colonialism partly rests.111 Yet, genderfuck politics
do not suffice to challenge settler colonialism and must be complemented
with concrete and active acts of support toward Indigenous communities.
Privacy as refusal is atransfeminist response to the cisheteropatriarchal
need for well-defined, binary gender categories. It is a feminist refusal
of the state's authority to order our gendered experiences. When the
state's protection of sexual autonomy is grounded in a cisnormative and
homophobic narration of non-disclosure, the most feminist move may
well be to refuse to involve the state in our sexual life.
3. Navigating critiques ofprivacy
Privacy is a controversial notion. In this section, I seek to demonstrate
how my vision of privacy as refusal, located within a transfeminist
project, can be sustained despite the various critiques of privacy appearing
in feminist and queer scholarship. An argument for privacy as refusal
argues not from the premise of an irreducible core of personal freedom
from investigation and interference, but rather sees privacy as a means of
shielding vulnerable populations from at least some of the violence they
face in a society defined by its inequities. By seeing the value of privacy
in terms of harm-reduction, my conception of privacy as refusal limits the
risks of mobilising privacy rights in favour of trans lives.
111. Aeyal Gross, supra note 2.
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Critiques of privacy, though often couched in abstract terms, cannot
be divorced from the socio-juridical context within which they were
voiced. They were made in specific contexts and oftentimes appeared in
conversation with influential legal cases, notably in relation to sodomy
laws, abortion rights, and partner violence. Tempting as it may be to read
their exhortation to abandon the ideal of privacy in a universalist fashion,
it would be an eminently uncharitable reading of critics' work. Kendall
Thomas, in an article critiquing privacy right's failure to address public
discrimination against queer people, began his critique of privacy in
the context of anti-sodomy laws litigation. He poses two questions: "In
theoretical discourse, does the language of privacy provide an adequate
vocabulary for critically assessing the Court's reasoning and result in
Hardwick? In political discourse, does it permit a sufficiently precise
articulation of the concrete social interests for which Hardwick served
as a constitutional flashpoint?" '112 While he ultimately concludes that it is
inappropriate to rely on privacy rights to overturn U.S. anti-sodomy laws,
these questions intimate an openness to the potential of privacy, which
may be well-suited as a policy rationale in a different case.1"3
According to Catharine A. MacKinnon, the "privacy doctrine
reaffirms and reinforces what the feminist critique of sexuality criticizes:
the public/private split."1 4 The right to privacy relies on a distinction
between the public sphere and the private sphere, with the home as the
quintessential example of the private sphere. According to the feminist
critique put forward by MacKinnon, precluding state interference in the
private sphere harms women because it grants men a licence to engage
in sexual and intimate partner violence. "This right to privacy is a right
of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time." 15 Whereas the
right to privacy purports to be gender neutral, it relies on a distinction
between public and private spheres which reflects a gendered division of
society. Accordingly, a feminist approach to law ought to reject privacy
rights and instead welcome incursions into the private sphere in the hopes
of preventing violence against women.
112. Kendall Thomas, "Beyond the Privacy Principle" (1992) 92:6 Colum L Rev 1431 at 1435.
113. As for those who are less explicit with regards to the contextual contingency of their arguments,
their work is no more divorced from historical context than mine. But even working from a distinct
socio-historical context, their critiques may reveal tensions and fault lines operating along different
frontiers of advocacy-including the one at which this paper is situated.
114. Catharine A MacKinnon, "Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983)" in Feminism
Unmodified: Discourses on Life andLaw (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 93 at 93.
115. MacKinnon, ibid at 102.
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Such critiques tend to play on a universalising, white-and perhaps,
ironically, patriarchal-logic which depicts rights as all-good or all-bad.116
However, it is possible to acknowledge that privacy rights can be deployed
in harmful manners without committing to the view that they are always
bad. Most dangerously, such abstract arguments against privacy risks
perpetuating injustices against marginalised groups by depriving them of
effective-but-unrevolutionary legal tools while granting more discretionary
powers to oppressive state agents like the police and prosecutors.1 7 Critical
race theorists and especially Black feminist scholars such as Patricia
Williams have convincingly shown that theoretical arguments against
rights can fail to account for the ways in which rights being withheld from
certain groups necessitates rights-granting as a form of harm-reduction
and on the path to equality. 8
Foregrounding privacy as refusal is compatible with feminism insofar
as it is a harm-reduction argument mobilised to protect a vulnerable group:
in this respect, it is less akin to an abuser using privacy as a shield from
state involvement, and more akin to a shelter refusing to give personal
information on its users. This latter refusal also relies on privacy. 19 If
privacy is about the allocation of power, as Anita L. Allen argues, then the
contestability of privacy rights becomes a matter of whether the proposed
distribution of power increases and undermines justice. 2  Many feminists
have adopted more nuanced critiques of privacy rights which focus on
its problematic aspects in concretely enabling violence.' It is important
to ask who is benefitted by privacy. Who is accorded sight and who is
rendered invisible? In answering those questions, we must keep in mind
the role of state surveillance in perpetuating state violence and reifying
116. Jennifer C Cash has highlighted the whiteness of those critiques and foregrounded the need to
move away from a politics of purity in order to more adequately address intersectional harm: Jennifer
C. Cash, "From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory" (2005) 11
Cardozo J L & Gender 303.
117. The oppressive functioning of policing in Canada has been thoroughly detailed from a racial
perspective in Robyn Maynard's Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the
Present (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2017).
118. Patricia Williams, "The Pain of Word Bondage" in The Alchemy of Race andRights: Diary of a
Law Professor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 149; see also Cash, supra note 116.
119. Anita L Allen, "Coercing Privacy" (1999) 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 723 at 745-746; Elizabeth M
Schneider, "The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women's Rights" (2002) 1 U Chicago Legal F
137 at 152.
120. Allen, supra note 119 at 749-750.
121. Allen, supra note 119; Williams, supra note 118 at 164; Schneider, supra note 119; Taunya
Lovell Banks, "Women and AIDS-Racism, Sexism, and Classism" (1989-90) 17 NYU Rev L &
Soc Change 351; Jennifer C Cash, supra note 116; Jodi Dean, "From Sphere to Boundary: Sexual
Harassment, Identity, and the Shift in Privacy" (1993) 6:2 Yale JL & Feminism 349.
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disciplinary norms. I hope that no feminist will cheer on the construction
of the panopticon.
Although the public-versus-private spheres has been a dominant
conception of privacy, notably in the U.S. legal system, a new vision
of privacy as informational rather than geographical has been growing
in prominence and is reflected in the approach of privacy as refusal.
Although Allen portrays this shift as a "rapid erosion of expectations of
personal privacy and of the taste for personal privacy," ' it may be more
accurate to depict it as a shift towards a conception of privacy as control
of information. I may not care if specific people know I am trans, but I do
care about being the one to let them know. This shift in conception was
perhaps inevitable in the age of social media when geographical location
matters little and information sticks around for what seems like forever.
The mobilisation of privacy in a sexual context may invite fears that
feminist gains on implied consent and intimate partner violence are at risk
of erosion. However, any impact on such gain is mitigated by the fact that
privacy is being used in the current case to empower vulnerable partners
rather than powerful ones, unlike the usual scenario where privacy protects
the more powerful partner. Accompanied by a clear delineation of tangible
and identifiable harm to a marginalised group-people have been murdered
for being trans, to speak only of the most evident harm-privacy as refusal
avoids eroding feminist efforts against violence, unlike individualising
views of privacy as a geographical sphere free from state interference.
Privacy as refusal is a narrow, targeted cognizance of the social context
within which trans people operate and does not lend itself-or at least,
doesn't as much lend itself-to the specter of patriarchal perversion.
Queer critiques, including that of Kendall Thomas, have similarly
highlighted the problematic underpinnings of the public/private spheres
dichotomy. Defending people who engage sexually and romantically with
partners of the same sex on the basis that what happens in the bedroom
is no one else's business fails to capture the public nature of same-sex
relationships. "Don't ask, don't tell" exemplifies this concern. Cathy
A. Harris points out: "If an attorney argues that her client's sexuality is
private, and therefore constitutionally protected from state regulation, she
reinforces societal notions that homosexuality should be hidden." '23
122. Allen, supra note 119 at 729.
123. Cathy A Harris, "Outing Privacy Litigation: Toward a Contextual Strategy for Lesbian and Gay
Rights" (1997) 65 Geo WashL Rev 248 at 250.
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Cathy A. Harris, in the context of the U.S. challenge to anti-sodomy
laws in Bowers v. Hardwick, 124 rightly claims that "the privacy strategy
imposes severe limitations on how attorneys portray lesbians and gays
in the courtroom. 125 In arguing that private acts should remain private,
protection is accorded to those whose queerness is essentially private.
Those who are visibly read as queer in everyday life or who engaged in
acts which aren't unambiguously private-for instance acts occurring
outside the home-are left vulnerable to homophobic judges and juries.
Queer people are required, in a way, to be "straight-passing."
Moreover, focus on privacy erases the context of the privacy violation,
which is often public. As Kendall Thomas points out, "Hardwick is not
just a story about private homoerotic acts and their interdiction; it is also
an account of the harassment, the humiliation, and the violence that await
the mere assertion or imputation of homosexual identities and existences
in the public sphere.1 126 The defendant, Hardwick, had been identified as
gay because he worked at a gay bar. Following this initial identification,
Bowers acted under the colour of law to harass Hardwick and may have
even incited others to beat him up. The discriminatory elements of the case
story were vacated by the chosen constitutional angle.
Focusing on privacy risks ignoring the discriminatory context within
which putative violations of privacy operate. However, I do not believe
that this is necessarily the case. We should be wary of extending Kendall
Thomas' arguments to other jurisdictional contexts and other types of
charges. His argument is essentially that privacy was ill-suited to capturing
the wrong that occurred in Hardwick and, by extension, other cases
involving anti-sodomy laws. But, it may be better suited in other contexts.
Privacy as refusal in the context of (trans)gender history non-disclosure
differs from the privacy-based attack on anti-sodomy laws. It is not tied
to the home as a zone of privacy where sexuality runs free. Trans scholars
and activists advocate for the abolition of the obligation to declare one's
gender identity in most contexts. 12' Thus, the expansion of privacy to the
sexual fraud context relies on a pre-existing narrative of privacy and does
not imply a rigid distinction between public and privacy spheres. Indeed, it
would be difficult to argue that public identification documents fall within
124. (1986) 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841.
125. Harris, supra note 123 at 249.
126. Thomas, supra note 112 at 1442.
127. Heath Fogg-Davis, Beyond Trans: Does Gender Matter? (New York: NYU Press, 2017); Spade,
supra note 108; Saskatchewan Human Rights v Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 159; Allison Tierney,
"This Person Just Received Ontario's First Non-Binary Birth Certificate", VICE News (7 May 2018)
[perma.cc/6GWT-V6JJ]. In consultations with the federal government in 2018, many activists and
scholars expressed the opinion that gender should generally not be asked on government forms.
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the private sphere. A "don't ask, don't tell" policy is incompatible with a
view of privacy as control over informational flow.
Although the queer critique highlights pitfalls of privacy discourse,
notably as it encourages coercive privacy, which sees the private sphere as
an area free not just from governmental interference but from disclosure
altogether, seeing privacy as control over sensitive information 128 in
the context of unequal relationships doesn't similarly risk legitimating
policies such as "don't ask, don't tell." Privacy is about the distribution
of power, as Allen highlights. 129 When framed as a form of corrective or
protection for vulnerable people, and especially marginalised groups, we
shift toward understanding privacy less as a sphere and more as control
over information. Control over information, unlike spheres, necessarily
implies a right to freely disclose just as much as it implies the right not to.
In arguing that Alex Sharpe's equality-centric arguments are overly
narrow, my argument isn't that equality should be thrown out the window
but rather that it shouldn't be the sole or primary right around which to
articulate a defence against (trans)gender fraud charges. But implicit in my
discussion ofwhy privacy rights are warranted is the recognition that privacy
can serve the underlying value of equality and is mutually constituted
with equality rights. Firstly, the idea that "accidental homosexuality" is
a form of legitimate harm reeks of unquestioned heteronormativity. But
second, the idea that forcing people to disclose their (trans)gender history
may harm them requires an understanding of the marginalisation of trans
people and the pervasiveness of transantagonism. Because privacy is, in
this case, a corrective against oppression, it is ineluctably constituted in
pair with equality, even if equality isn't the primary right being raised.
Craig Willse and Dean Spade take a more radical view in assailing
the mobilisation of privacy, this time in the context of the successful U.S.
case against anti-sodomy laws, Lawrence v. Texas. 130 They adopt a view
of privacy as legitimating regulatory norms that dictate how lives should
be lived. In Lawrence, the majority struck down Texas' anti-sodomy law
"by addressing homosexuality in terms of 'coupled' behavior, rather than
specific acts of sodomy, thereby constructing a homosexual identity more
128. Jodi Dean has suggested that our conception of privacy should be determined discursively by
inquiring into facts and activities which are constitutive of our identity: Dean, supra note 121 at 380.
However, I am concerned that such a view relies on the abstraction of identity and de-emphasizes the
underlying rationale for privacy protection, which is rooted in the potential effects of proliferation
of information and intrusion upon seclusion on concrete, tangible lives. This is why my argument is
primarily rooted in material conditions, and more specifically the identifiable, real harms that lack of
control over information brings about.
129. Allen, supra note 119 at 749-750.
130. (2003) 539 US 558, 123 S Ct 2472.
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parallel to incentivized heterosexual family norms." '1 3 1 Willse and Spade
are deeply critical of the court's failure to challenge the mechanics of
discipline, notably as it incentivises certain family structures and pictures
of citizenship. By focusing on the private, the majority chose a pictorial
avenue which directly legitimated the distribution of life-chances around
marriage as a site of personal flourishing, reflecting a heteronormative
assumption that queer lives, if they are to be acceptable lives, must be
arranged by the state in the same manner as heterosexual lives. The struggle
against anti-sodomy laws through privacy rights, and later the struggle
for same-sex marriage, reflects "an acceptance of existing criminal and
civil incentives for compliance with regulatory norms regarding sexual
practices and family structures," '132 something of which we should be
critical. I wholeheartedly agree with this critique.
My argument is not incompatible with this view, however. Willse
and Spade's work is rooted in the specific context of U.S. caselaw around
gay rights. There is no clear parallel to disciplinary norms of marriage at
play in (trans)gender fraud. Quite the contrary, the argument for privacy
de-emphasises the assumptions of committed monogamous coupling,
insofar as it requires full and forthcoming exchange of information to
foster lifelong companionship through marriage. I instead begin from the
assumption that people have sex in all sorts of contexts, not all of which are
conducive to safe disclosure. Although disclosure of (trans)gender history
is frequently unsafe even within the context of marriage and long-term
committed relationships, it is even more fraught outside of them. Privacy
as refusal is a stance against state-mandated social ordering and against
state violence through criminalization.133 We do not have to fit ourselves
into well-delineated gender boxes so the state can better order our lives.
By emphasizing the vulnerability of transgender and gender non-
conforming people in interpersonal relationships, privacy as refusal
reflects a shift away from patriarchal conceptions of the individual as
autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient. 34 This is the assumption
found in liberal conceptions of privacy, which leads to the belief that "so
131. Craig Willse & Dean Spade, "Freedom in a Regulatory State: Lawrence, Marriage and
Biopolitics" (2005) 11 Widener L Rev 309 at 314 [perma.cc/E4EG-7495].
132. Willse & Spade, ibid 131 at 324.
133. For a discussion of abolitionism as a goal of critical trans politics, see Morgan Bassichis,
Alexander Lee & Dean Spade, "Building AnAbolitionist Trans and Queer Movement With Everything
We've Got," in Eric A Stanley & Nat Smith, eds, Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison
Industrial Complex (Oakland: AK Press, 2011) 16.
134. Erinn Cunniff Gilson, "Intersubjective vulnerability, ignorance, and sexual violence" in Matthias
Gross & Linsey McGoey, eds, Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies (New York:
Routledge, 2015) 228 at 230.
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long as the public does not interfere, autonomous individuals interact
freely and equally." '135 The patriarchal view of privacy ignores the banality
of vulnerability. We are always vulnerable and vulnerability "both makes
it possible for us to be undone, often by one another, and be harmed or
violated, and makes it possible for us to take care, be empathetic, and forge
relationships." '136 Trans and gender non-conforming people are, of course,
especially vulnerable, but our potential for vulnerability comes from the
fact that we're human like everyone else.
This vision is sharply distinct from the patriarchal conception critiqued
by Catharine Mackinnon, which sees people as relatively invulnerable. 3 '
When we see people as fundamentally vulnerable, our view of privacy
must shift accordingly because we can no longer rely on the assumption
that they're best left alone until relatively-rare harms concretise. Unlike
the wholesale rejection of privacy, which acknowledges the banality of
vulnerability while ignoring its constructive aspects and thus readily
proposes that trans and gender non-conforming people abstain from sexual
relationships altogether if that is the cost of avoiding non-disclosure, 38
privacy as refusal recognises the necessity to distribute control over
information to both prevent harm-an equality-driven and materially-
grounded exercise rather than an abstraction-and foster conditions under
which lives and relationships can flourish.
In this respect, we have much to learn from Critical Race Theory and
more specifically from Patricia Williams, who teaches us that:
The task for Critical Legal Studies, then, is not to discard rights but to
see through or past them so that they reflect a larger definition of privacy
[... ]:so that privacy is turned from exclusion based on self-regard into
regard for another's fragile, mysterious autonomy [...1139
Though elaborated in a different context, Williams' teaching seems
emphatically applicable to (trans)gender fraud. Trans bodies are overtly
and routinely scrutinised if not surveilled. The ideal trans subject is naked.
Applying privacy to (trans)gender history non-disclosure doesn't shield
135. MacKinnon, supra note 114 at 99.
136. Gilson, supra note 134 at 231.
137. MacKinnon, supra note 114 at 99.
138. An example of such de-contextualised conceptions of harm can be found in the concurrent
judgement of Justice L'Heureux-Dube in the HIV non-disclosure case R v Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR
371. Professing a vehemently feminist if perhaps misguided spirit, she depicts the harms of sexual
fraud in such abstract terms that she would make non-disclosure of any material fact a criminal offence
garnering up to 14 years in jail as well as lifetime registration as a sexual offender, independently of
the complainant's subjective experience of harm or the consequences of requiring disclosure.
139. Williams, supra note 118 at 164.
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structures of dominance. It undermines them. At last, trans bodies are
allowed clothing.
V. Privacy and (trans)gender fraud in Canadian law
Asking how Canadian courts may respond to charges laid for (trans)gender
history non-disclosure is uncomfortable. First, because it contemplates
the possibility of such criminalisation occurring-a scary thought for a
scholar who is transgender and does not benefit from emotional distance to
the topic. Second, because the law not only makes abstract debates out of
a flesh-and-blood case, but also tends to isolate that case from the broader
social dynamics and structures of oppression which gives rise to cases like
the one before the court. And third, it's uncomfortable because engaging
with the courts seems to confer some legitimacy-however little of it-to
their interposition in transgender lives. I view courts as both ideological
and repressive state apparatuses, meaning that they play an integral part in
perpetuating oppression through state-sponsored violence and the policing
of disciplinary norms.14 Yet in a bid precisely to oppose conditions of
violence fostered by the state, engagement with law may be a necessity-
multiple consciousness inevitably comes forth when violence is so near:
There are times to stand outside the courtroom door and say "this
procedure is a farce, the legal system is corrupt, justice will never prevail
in this land as long as privilege rules in the courtroom." There are times
to stand inside the courtroom and say "this is a nation of laws, laws
recognizing fundamental values of rights, equality and personhood."''
In R. v. Hutchinson, 142 the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with charges
of aggravated sexual assault by sexual fraud after Hutchinson poked holes
in the condom. The complainant became pregnant. Prior to Hutchinson,
the sexual fraud provisions had been interpreted in the context of HIV non-
disclosure cases.143 The court developed a two-steps test for sexual fraud
cases. "' First, the Court inquired into whether the complainant voluntarily
consented to the sexual activity in question. Second, the Court turned to
whether the consent had been vitiated due to fraud.
At the first step, focus is placed on the two traditional forms of sexual
fraud, namely the sexual nature of the act-whether it is a sexual act as
140. Louis Althusser, "Ideologie et appareils ideologiques d'Etat (Notes pour une recherche)" in Sur
la reproduction (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011) 263. See also Spade, supra note 108.
141. Mar Matsuda, "When The First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method"
(1989) 11:1 Women's Rts L Rep 7 at 8.
142. 2014 SCC 19.
143. R v Cuerrier, supra note 138; R v Mabior, 2012 SCC 47; R v DC, 2012 SCC 48.
144. Hutchinson, supra note 142 at para 6.
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opposed to, say, a medical examination-and identity of the partner.145
Harm is not required for consent to be vitiated where the deceit goes to the
sexual nature of the act or the identity of the partner.146
Fraud comes in two elements: dishonesty and deprivation.147 Thus,
consent will be vitiated where there is both dishonesty, including non-
disclosure of important facts, and harm as serious as the "significant risk of
serious bodily harm" standard established in HIV non-disclosure cases.148
The law bears striking similarity to the English law under which
McNally was judged. Both Canada and England recognise that consent
may be vitiated by deceit as to the nature of the act or the identity of
the person.149 Both also recognise a residual category of sexual fraud
beyond those two types. However, the line surrounding the boundaries
of this residual category differs in the two jurisdictions: Canada requires
a threshold degree of harm or risk thereof whereas England requires
active deception.15 However, as Alex Sharpe has detailed, stereotypes
and prejudices play a significant role in establishing whether deception
is active, such that (trans)gender fraud can be established quite passively.
The McNally decision cannot be transposed into Canadian law without
identifying a relevant type of harm which would serve as anchor to sexual
fraud. It is unclear what precisely the harm would be that is elevated to
the level of "significant risk of serious bodily harm." In Hutchinson, the
complainant became pregnant against her will, and in HIV non-disclosure
cases the risk was couched in physical terms. For the Supreme Court in
Cuerrier, writing in 1998 prior to widespread availability of highly-active
anti-retroviral therapy, the danger was "terrible suffering and death." '151 By
contrast, the alleged harm of (trans)gender history non-disclosure is solely
psychological and grounded in homophobia. That the perceived harm is
rooted in homophobia is relevant since "it would not be appropriate to
ascribe to the ordinary person the characteristic of being homophobic if
the accused were the recipient of a homosexual advance." '152 Although
neither the ordinary nor the reasonable person standard are applied in
sexual fraud cases, the Supreme Court's reluctance to give weight to
145. Ibid at para 22.
146. Ibid at para 42.
147. Ibid at para 67.
148. Ibid at para 70.
149. McNally, supra note 5 at para 17. A number of other relevant circumstances to determining the
presence of consent is set out in Sexual OffencesAct 2003, supra note 16, s 76.
150. McNally, supra note 5 at paras 19ff.
151. Unfortunately, the Court failed to give due weight to the currently high quality of life of people
living with HIV when, in 2012, it was faced withMabior, supra note 143 and DC, supra note 143.
152. R v Tran, 2010 SCC 58 at para 34.
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prejudicial attitudes as well as its commitment to the value of equality
under the Charter153 makes it nearly inconceivable that non-disclosure
of (trans)gender history would be seen as sufficiently harmful to lead to
charges of sexual fraud under the second part of the test.
However, dismissing the existence of (trans)gender fraud as a crime in
Canada requires us to turn to the question of impersonation and deceit as
to the sexual nature of the act.
False impersonation grounded the Israeli charges against Hen Alkobi.
Appealing to a dictionary definition, the Haifa District Court "stressed
that, from a linguistics perspective, the expression 'impersonating another
person' can encompass impersonating a person of another sex."154
This interpretation of "false impersonation" clashes with the history of
the concept. Both sexual fraud as to the sexual nature of the act and as to the
identity of the person are grounded in a puritanical and conservative sexual
morality which centres married sex. Sexual fraud was only recognised
where the complainant could be depicted as morally innocent of sex
outside of marriage or committed relationship. This led to the notions of
fraud as to the sexual nature of the act, which could be applied where, e.g.,
a doctor touched the complainant for a sexual purpose while presenting it
as a medical procedure, and fraud as to the identity of the person, notably in
cases of impersonating the husband of the woman.155 Although the notion
must evolve as our conceptions of sexual morality thankfully also shift,
this history of relevant to understanding why false impersonation was seen
as wrong and why the Supreme Court of Canada chose to define sexual
fraud due to impersonation "in the narrow sense of the specific identity
of a partner who is personally known to the complainant." '156 Replaced in
its historical and moral context, impersonation seems unlikely to ground
charges of aggravated sexual assault by virtue of (trans)gender fraud.
Such an analysis also challenges the possibility of laying charges
based on deceit as to the sexual nature of the act. As the Supreme Court
states in Hutchinson, establishing deceit as to the sexual nature of the
activity involves asking whether "the act was sexual in nature as opposed
to being for a different purpose, such as a medical examination.""15 This
is much narrower than the view articulated in McNally, which claims that
"while, in a physical sense, the acts of assault by penetration of the vagina
153. Canadian Charter, supra note 81.
154. Gross, supra note 2 at 175.
155. Jed Rubenfeld, "The Riddle of Rape-By-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy" (2013)
122 Yale U 1372 at 1397 [perma.cc/M6FB-G8SV].
156. Hutchinson, supra note 142 at para 57.
157. Ibid at para 57.
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are the same whether perpetrated by a male or a female, the sexual nature
of the acts is, on any common sense view, different where the complainant
is deliberately deceived by a defendant into believing that the latter is a
male ."158
The greatest risk of criminalisation, in my opinion, lies not in any of
those forms of vitiation of consent but rather in the notion that consent
involves consent to the sexual activity in question. Would using a strap-on
dildo instead of a flesh penis change the very sexual activity in question?
This seems to be the case in the Supreme Court's view, for whom the
sexual activity in question refers to the "physical act itself (for example,
kissing, petting, oral sex, intercourse, or the use of sex toys)." 59 This
would shift the question from (trans)gender fraud to whether sex toys were
knowingly used. I submit that this is most appropriately considered at the
second step of the analysis-where harm is considered-when the sex
toy is of a similar shape and is used in a similar manner as flesh penises.
The primary differences between flesh penises and strap-on dildos is the
potential for harm are pregnancy and STI transmission: both are lower
with strap-on dildos.16°
Turning our mind to privacy allows us to understand (trans)gender
history non-disclosure as an act which does not warrant criminal sanction
independently of the step at which the analysis of (trans)gender fraud is
held.
Criminal law is a blunt and dangerous instrument. Thus, it is the
Court's role to draw "a line between conduct deserving the harsh sanction
of the criminal law, and conduct that is undesirable or unethical but 'lacks
the reprehensible character of criminal acts." 61 It was consciousness of
this role which led the Supreme Court to establish the harm threshold
in sexual fraud cases. This is done by balancing a number of factors,
including Charter values.162 As the Supreme Court makes clear, "Quebec
legislation must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of the
Quebec Charter."163 The same is true of all Canadian legislation and the
Canadian Charter.
158. McNally, supra note 5 at para 26.
159. Hutchinson, supra note 142 at para 54.
160. The same cannot be said of vibrating dildos, inflating dildos, butt plugs, and other sex toys which
are experientially very different from flesh penises. My comment on heat transfer notwithstanding,
this is likely what allowed confusion as to the referent when McNally spoke of "putting it in," with
McNally referring to the strap-on dildo and the complainant interpreting the expression as referring to
a flesh penis: Sharpe, supra note 1 at 217.
161. Hutchinson, supra note 142 at para 18.
162. Mabior, supra note 143 at para 58; Hutchinson, supra note 142 at para 72.
163. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Communaute
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Autonomy is a core value and is the most directly applicable to cases
of sexual fraud, but privacy is also an important value of the Charter and
has been underappreciated in this context.
The applicability of privacy can be easily understood when considering
the notion of fraud. Vitiation of consent by fraud at the second step of
the Hutchinson analysis requires not only deprivation but dishonesty.
Dishonesty, like deception, isn't purely behavioural. The Oxford English
Dictionary's definition of deceit is informative in this respect: deceit refers
to the "concealment of the truth in order to mislead." '164 More than just a
concealment of truth, it must be done with a dishonourable and morally
questionable intention. The definition of dishonesty similarly highlights
the moral evaluation inherent in the term: "Discreditable as being at
variance with straightforward or honourable dealing." '165
We don't typically consider that, say, an employee who allows
employers to think they are straight out of fear of discrimination is being
dishonest or deceitful. Their motivations are understandable. The same
cannot be said of an employee who conceals their sexual orientation-
being straight-to benefit from a scholarship reserved for queer students.
Intention and context matter when evaluating whether something
amounts to dishonesty and deception and is therefore sufficiently morally
condemnable to warrant criminalisation.
Although the first step of the analysis in Hutchinson does not explicitly
require deceit or dishonesty-the Court specifies that "mistaken belief
about the identity of the partner or the sexual nature of the act" precludes
consent "whether or not that mistake is the result of a deception"-this
requirement becomes implicitly reintroduced when considering the mens
rea of sexual assault since an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief as
to consent negates the mens rea necessary for sexual assault. 66
Removing the requirement of deceit or dishonesty is typically
reasonable precisely because the defence of honest and reasonable
mistake of fact provides an exculpatory mechanism for morally innocent
defendants, especially in the context of sexual fraud where honest and
reasonable yet mistaken beliefs can relatively easily be imagined.
Removing the requirement of deceit or dishonesty, however, fails to
account for other forms of relative moral innocence such as those involving
and omission which, although deliberate, is done in a legitimate spirit of
urbaine de Montreal, [2004] 1 SCR. 789 at para 20, affirmed in Quebec (Commission des normes, de
l'equite, de la sante et de la securite du travail) v Caron, 2018 SCC 3 at para 32.
164. Oxford English Dictionary Online, sub verbo "deceit," online: <www.oed.com >.
165. Oxford English Dictionary Online, sub verbo "dishonesty," online: <www.oed.com >.
166. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 265(4).
Genderfucking Non-Disclosure
self-preservation. Faced with charges of (trans)gender fraud, however, it
will be necessary for courts to address this gap in the law. Refusing to
consider and balance the privacy interests of those accused with (trans)
gender history non-disclosure would run contrary to the Charter16 insofar
as legislation must be interpreted in light of it or be constitutionally
deficient.
Privacy, understood co-constitutively with equality, provides us with
a principled standard to distinguish between cases like that in Hutchinson
where the accused's intention was to cause pregnancy and those like
McNally where the accused's privacy interests were strongly implicated,
given the immense psychological and material risks of disclosing (trans)
gender history. In a world where people get murdered for flirting while
trans, can we blame people for wanting greater control over the timing and
context of disclosure?
Privacy and equality are interpretive guides and must be balanced
against the value of autonomy. Balancing privacy, equality, and autonomy
recognises that complainants can experience subjective harm despite the
absence of criminal conduct.
When balancing those values, the duality of autonomy must be
recognised. Whereas it can be impinged on by deceit, we should be
careful not to vitiate expressed consent too readily lest we fail to take
consent sufficiently seriously. Consent as a subjective state of mind is all-
or-nothing. The same cannot be said of vitiation which involves a moral
evaluation which is a matter of degrees. Consent is an act by which we
take on moral responsibility, deliberately positioning ourselves as the
source of the act and making it ours in a deep moral sense. To vitiate it too
readily would be infantilising.
Sexual autonomy is a crucially important value. It should be handled
with utmost seriousness. Nonetheless, cast in concrete terms, the privacy
interests of transgender and gender non-conforming people in contexts
of sexual fraud outweigh the interest in sexual autonomy of their sexual
partners. Transgender and gender non-conforming people face extreme
stigma due to their relationship to gender norms. They are typically the
most vulnerable partner in relationships and are frequently subjected to
intimate partner violence. To force disclosure of their (trans)gender history
puts them at significant risk and runs contrary to the private character
of that history. That gender identity and gender history are private is a
relatively uncontroversial claim.16 This approach merely incorporates into
167. Canadian Charter, supra note 81.
168. Florence Ashley, "Qui est-ille? Le respect langagier des eleves non-binaires, aux limites du
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the criminal law context the insight that (trans)gender history is a private
matter and makes good on the Supreme Court's promise not to "stigmatize
and criminalize an already vulnerable group." '169
Although the legal contexts are different, the notion of privacy
is also helpful in the English and Israeli contexts, especially given the
two jurisdictions' reliance on deceit in establishing sexual fraud. The
judges in McNally and Alkobi failed to adequately inquire into the moral
content of the notion of deceit."' 0 Understanding (trans)gender history as
quintessentially private information forces us to acknowledge that non-
disclosure does not necessarily amount to deceit, especially when the
stakes are so high.
Transgender and gender non-conforming people are vulnerable in
intimate relationships and must be granted the tools necessary to protect
themselves against the routine weaponization of prejudice. Privacy is such
a tool. Our ability to distinguish (trans)gender fraud from poking holes
in a condom as was the case in Hutchinson using the notion of privacy
further demonstrates its power as an analytical device. Given the current
state of Canadian sexual fraud law, with the requirement of harm and
the constitutional entrenchment of privacy and equality interests, courts
should reject (trans)gender history non-disclosure as justifying charges of
aggravated sexual assault.
Conclusion
We are all navigating the unruly sea of desires on which relationships
float. To turn fucking into a crime because the person's gender challenges
the sexual identity of their consenting partners is an attempt to further
entrench a cisheteronormative social order. It returns sex to its puritanical
theorisation under the spectre of marriage and procreation, inhibiting the
full blossoming of queer and genderfuck intimacies.
The law is both vessel and architect of public opinion. Where the
law lends the state's power in support of stigma, it risks not only causing
more harm than it prevents but also creating the very harm it seeks to
prevent. By sending the message that disgust toward trans bodies and
queer sexualities garners state protection, it validates and reproduces that
very disgust in those who are listening. Yet, if we answer that this disgust
is invalid because trans genders are authentic, we devalue the lives of
those whose identities aren't so neatly defined and leave disgust toward
droit" (2017) 63:2 Service social 35 at 39-40; Order F2016-26 (Re), 2016 CanLII 82100 (AB OJPC).
See also The Gazette c Valiquette, [1997] RJQ 30 (C.A.).
169. Hutchinson, supra note 142 at para 94 (minority); Mabior, supra note 143 at paras 66-67.
170. Israeli law even requires the "intent to deceive": Gross, supra note 2 at 176.
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queer sexualities untouched. By foregrounding the existence of those who
challenge neat gender identity categorisation, we can better recognise the
messiness of everyday life and protect those whose lives are gloriously,
beautifully messy. Instead of a politics of respectability, I hope we can
rally around a genderfuck politics.
Mobilising the notion of privacy in law allows us to refuse state
interference in our sexual lives as we navigate gender and struggle to
make sense of ourselves in a rigidly ordered social world.171 Far from the
individualism of liberal conceptions of privacy, privacy as refusal resists
the gender confinement imposed on us by patriarchal institutions. I have
high hopes that refraining our arguments around privacy as refusal can
blossom into change for the better.
171. A similar argument from privacy could perhaps be mobilised in the context of HIV non-
disclosure. I am not aware of privacy rights ever being considered in such a manner by a Canadian
court. However, the balancing of privacy and autonomy would necessarily differ to the extent that
avoidance of harm is part of the underlying value of autonomy.

